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Diverging Pathways: How Pre-Migration Selectivity and Initial Legal 





Drawing on a unique, large-sample survey from France, Trajectories and Origins (TeO), this 
article aims to disentangle the effects of migrants’ initial legal status from their pre-migration 
characteristics on five outcomes: family income, unemployment, neighborhood income 
disadvantage, segregation and self-rated health. Findings show that outcomes vary by legal 
status, but that most of these disparities disappear once pre-migration variables are 
accounted for. Still, we find net effects of legal status for some categories. Asylum seekers 
tend to face greater disadvantage in terms of family income and segregation, while students 
report higher family income and lower neighborhood income disadvantage. Migrants with 
worker status or a French spouse permit also tend to experience less neighborhood income 
disadvantage and segregation. Yet interactions between legal status and country of origin 
show that these effects are not constant across groups. Sub-Saharan Africans and migrants 
from other non-European countries are the most strongly impacted by disadvantaged status.2  
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As soon as migrants cross the border from country of origin to country of destination, 
receiving states sort newcomers along legal lines of demarcation based on residency status. 
These legal distinctions upon arrival grant or deny rights and opportunities and determine 
access to citizenship and socioeconomic resources, with potentially long-reaching 
implications for immigrant integration. Certain legal statuses allow migrants to enter the labor 
market immediately (i.e. work permits), while others provide a faster track to citizenship (i.e. 
marriage permits). These classifications further shape the degree of inclusion and reception 
that immigrants encounter in their receiving society and the state. Asylum seekers may be 
more favorably received and granted access to specific social benefits, while those who 
migrated for family reunification purposes may be viewed with suspicion and subjected to 
stronger state control (Bellot 2015; Lochak 2006). 
This system of civic stratification (Morris 2003) forges categorical distinctions between 
groups based on initial contexts of reception, with potentially durable implications for 
migrants’ trajectories in their country of destination (Safi, forthcoming). However, empirical 
studies have seldom considered the long-term role of initial legal status for immigrant 
integration. One difficulty is linked to data availability. Most studies investigating the effects 
of legal status rely on data that measure current status and outcomes simultaneously, 
confounding the causal link between the two. A further impediment is related to immigrant 
selectivity. Immigrants’ initial legal status in their country of destination is highly determined 
by pre-migration characteristics formed in their countries of origin. Moreover, these pre-
migration characteristics such as education, income, and language skills go on to shape 
migrants’ ability to climb up the socioeconomic ladder in the receiving country (Borjas 1987, 
Feliciano 2006; Ichou 2014; Pong and Landale 2012). However, previous empirical research 
has rarely disentangled the role of specific, individual-level pre-migration characteristics from 
the effects of initial status. 
This article draws on a unique, large sample data source from France, the Trajectories and 
Origins (TeO) survey, to explore the role of legal status upon arrival on immigrants’ 
socioeconomic outcomes. TeO includes rare information on the type and timing of migrants’ 
first residency permit, a wide range of pre-migration variables and a variety of current 
outcomes. Three main questions guide the analysis: First, do immigrants’ integration 
outcomes, including their income, unemployment, neighborhood income disadvantage, 
segregation and self-rated health status, vary by the first legal permit obtained? Second, are 
these variations simply a reflection of pre-migration characteristics and selection, or do 
differences linked to legal status persist even when taking these factors into account? And 
finally, do all migrants’ trajectories vary by status, or is this only true for certain origin groups? 
Findings show that outcomes vary by initial legal status, but that most of these disparities 
disappear once pre-migration variables are accounted for. Still, we find net effects of legal 
status for some categories. Asylum seekers tend to face greater disadvantage in terms of family 
income and segregation, while students have higher income and lower neighborhood income 
disadvantage. Migrants with worker status or a French spouse permit also tend to experience 
less neighborhood income disadvantage and segregation. Yet interactions between legal status 




and country of origin show that these effects are not constant across groups. Sub-Saharan 
Africans and migrants from other non-European countries are the most strongly impacted by 
disadvantaged status.  
We make three significant contributions to the literature on legal status stratification and 
immigrant integration. First, while past studies of immigrant adaptation in France have 
focused on the significance of naturalization (Bertossi 2010; Fougère and Safi 2009), our 
study is one of the first to consider how legal categories beyond citizenship shape immigrant 
outcomes in France and examine these effects across multiple ethnic groups and dimensions 
of immigrant integration. Second, our study considers not only how immigrants’ initial legal 
status shapes their integration, but also how this initial categorization may operate net of the 
pre-migration characteristics that shape immigrants’ selection into their initial statuses. 
Finally, we show that while immigrants’ pre-migration characteristics remain significant for 
their post-migration outcomes, migrants’ initial legal status continues to have durable effects 
net of pre- and post-migration demographics controls. We theorize that immigrants’ initial 
legal status defines administrative and legal pathways in their integration process, carry 
tangible social connotations, and set migrants upon diverging socialization tracks. 
 
I. Initial legal status  
Nation states exercise control over entry, rights, and citizenship through the implementation 
of residency laws and legal status categories, generating a system of civic stratification by 
differentially allocating rights, resources, and membership (Brubaker 1992; Lockwood 1996; 
Morris 2003). Previous studies of the effects of civic stratification on immigrant outcomes 
have overwhelmingly focused on migrants’ legal status at the time the outcome is measured. 
These studies largely find that citizens are advantaged relative to noncitizens, and that 
undocumented and temporary-status immigrants face many disadvantages, particularly in the 
dimensions of socioeconomic attainment and health. Citizenship may lessen the labor market 
discrimination faced by immigrants from poorer or more stigmatized backgrounds, signaling 
to employers’ higher levels of integration and intentions of long-term residence (Bloemraad 
and Sheares 2017). As a result, naturalization can lead to better employment outcomes, 
particularly among those likely to be disadvantaged in the labor market, such as immigrants 
with lower levels of education (Bertossi 2010; Bratsberg, Ragan, and Nasir 2002; Fougère 
and Safi 2009). However, immigrants who lack secure legal standing in their receiving states 
may face strong social stigma and threats of deportation, are ineligible for many public 
benefits, and are often barred from stable, legal employment opportunities to advance their 
socioeconomic situation. Thus, legally vulnerable immigrants often report lower levels of 
socioeconomic attainment and mobility, diminished access to healthcare, and high levels of 
stress induced by their legal precarity (Borjas 2017; Hall, Greenman and Yi 2019; Larchanché 
2012; Ortega et al. 2018). 
However, an exclusive focus on migrants’ current legal status fails to paint a full picture of 
how legal stratification affects immigrant integration. Immigrant outcomes may also be 
shaped by prior legal statuses. In particular, initial legal status may structure immigrants’ 





trajectories in their country of destination. For example, refugees may face a more welcoming 
context of reception and greater access to resettlement resources, while those entering with 
spousal permits are granted lower barriers to naturalization and long-term residence (Portes 
and Rumbaut 2001; Weil 2001). Likewise, student and work statuses extend access to 
institutions and formal employment in the receiving state, but are temporary statuses that are 
conditional on continued academic and employment sponsorship (Tremblay 2005). 
Evidence from past studies suggests that immigrants’ integration outcomes may differ 
considerably by their initial legal status. In particular, immigrants entering with work or 
education-based permits report being advantaged relative to immigrants entering under other 
legal categories. Immigrants who migrate to the United States under employment visas report 
greater occupational mobility and higher wages relative to other entry status categories 
(Akresh 2006; Jasso, Massey, Rosenzweig, and Smith 2000; Massey and Malone 2002). 
Likewise, employment-based migrants to Australia have better self-reported health compared 
to other migrants, with refugees reporting the worst health outcomes (Chiswick, Lee, and 
Miller 2008). While the advantages reported by economic and student migrants may diminish 
over time (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1995), immigrants’ status at entry may also have 
implications for the outcomes of their children in their countries of destination. The children 
of parents arriving under skilled work and business visas in Canada, or student and tourist 
visas in the United States, have higher rates of university completion relative to the children 
of immigrants arriving under refugee or unskilled work visas (Hou and Bonikowska, 2017; 
Lee 2018). 
 
1.1. Immigrant selectivity 
Such disparities in outcomes by migrants’ status at entry may be attributable to differential 
selection into initial legal statuses on the basis of various demographic and pre-migration 
characteristics. Relative to non-migrants in their countries of origin, immigrants tend to be 
younger, report better physical health, and have higher levels of education (Chiswick, Lee, 
and Miller 2008; Feliciano 2005). Likewise, immigrants differ greatly in demographic 
characteristics by status at entry. Women make up a higher percentage of those entering under 
spouse and family reunification visas relative to men, who make up a higher percentage of 
those entering under work visas (Donato et al. 2011). Furthermore, due to historical patterns 
in refugee flows and labor recruitment, and dynamic relationships between sending and 
receiving states, immigrants from some countries may be more heavily represented in certain 
categories of entry (Menjivar 2000; US Department of State 2019). 
Immigrants also diverge in their pre-migration characteristics by initial legal status. Economic 
migrants are sponsored by employers in receiving states based on their skill set and work 
capacity demonstrated prior to migration. They frequently sign employment contracts prior to 
migration or have jobs awaiting them immediately upon arrival. Employment-based 
immigrants also tend to have higher levels of education and better language ability relative to 
other migrants (Akresh 2008; Jasso, Massey, Rosenzweig, and Smith 2000). Likewise, student 
migrants are allowed entry on the basis of their potential for educational attainment. They also 
come from more highly educated backgrounds in their country of origin and are more likely 




to speak the language of their country of destination (Hou and Bonikowska 2017). Marriage 
migrants are also more likely to speak the language of the receiving country, have more social 
ties, and report greater exposure to their country of destination prior to migration (Jasso, 
Massey, Rosenzweig, and Smith 2000). 
By contrast, family migrants and asylees are relatively disadvantaged in their pre-migration 
characteristics. While family migrants also have established social ties in their countries of 
destination prior to migration, they tend to report lower levels of educational attainment in 
their countries of origin and less transferable skills in the receiving labor market (Akresh 
2008). Furthermore, refugees frequently depart under difficult and traumatic circumstances 
from their sending countries, with little preparation for migration (Torres and Wallace 2013). 
Receiving states also impose fewer integration, human capital, and health requirements for 
refugees relative to other immigrants (Chiswick, Lee, and Miller 2008). Thus, refugees may 
arrive with lower pre-migration socioeconomic and language attainment and poorer health 
outcomes relative to other immigrants. Finally, those who enter without legal documents or 
under irregular statuses frequently report low levels of pre-migration human capital and skill 
attainment (Massey and Malone 2002). However, they may be positively selected for health, 
particularly in order to undertake clandestine and physically grueling border crossings 
(Barcellos, Goldman, and Smith 2012). 
 
1.2. Initial legal status or immigrant selectivity? 
 
Migrants who are “positively selected” (i.e., possess more advantaged sociodemographic 
characteristics prior to migration) may exhibit better integration outcomes in their countries 
of destination. Past studies of the effects of migrant selection have considered country of 
origin characteristics and immigrant parents’ education levels. Immigrants from countries 
with a higher Gross National Product, more open political system, and lower levels of income 
inequality have higher income in the United States relative to immigrants from poorer, less 
politically open, and more economically unequal countries (Borjas 1987). Likewise, 
immigrant parents’ higher educational attainment relative to non-migrants in their countries 
of origin is positively associated with their children’s educational attainment in receiving 
states (Feliciano 2006; Ichou 2014; Pong and Landale 2012). 
Previous research has theorized that differences in pre-migration selectivity, such as having a 
job contract before migration or prior visits to the country of destination, may explain 
immigrants’ differential outcomes by their status at entry (Akresh 2008). However, these 
studies have rarely empirically examined the role of specific, individual-level pre-migration 
characteristics, instead using status at entry categories themselves as direct proxies for 
selection (Akresh 2008, 2006; Chiswick, Lee, and Miller 2008; Lee 2018). The few studies of 
initial legal status that have included additional indicators of immigrant selectivity have 
mainly measured selectivity through country or region of origin fixed effects (Chiswick, Lee, 
and Miller 2008; Hou and Bonikowska 2017; Jasso, Massey, Rosenzweig, and Smith 2000; 
Massey and Malone 2002), broad country of origin characteristics, such as Gross National 
Product (Borjas 1987; Hou and Bonikowska 2017), or limit examinations of individual-level 





Miller 2008; Hou and Bonikowska 2017). Many other relevant indicators of pre-migration 
immigrant selectivity, including possessing a work contract before arrival, previous migration 
experiences and exposure to the country of destination, and pre-migration language ability, 
educational attainment, and marital status, have yet to be empirically examined in conjunction 
with of migrants’ status at entry. We therefore do not know whether immigrants’ legal status 
upon entry acts simply a proxy for their pre-migration characteristics and selectivity, or 
whether differences in migrants’ integration outcomes persist even when taking into account 
pre-migration sorting into initial legal status.  
 
II. Legal status in the French context 
Much of the research on immigrant selectivity and initial legal status has been conducted in 
the context of the United States, and little is known of how such mechanisms may play out in 
other receiving states. The oldest country of immigration in Europe, France’s approach to its 
foreign-born population is assimilationist in line with its Republican egalitarian tradition 
(Noiriel 1992; Favell 1998). This model places strong emphasis on citizenship as a motor of 
immigrant integration. Foreigners are considered to become members of the nation through a 
process of acculturation by which they successfully become French, incorporating new values, 
traditions and norms while shedding any markers of ethnic or cultural distinctiveness. 
However, France has relatively low naturalization rates compared to other countries (Liebig 
and von Haaren 2011), meaning migrants may settle and remain noncitizens for the long-term 
on the basis of residency permits. In the colorblind French Republican tradition, where racial 
or ethnic distinctions are not formally recognized (Simon 2008), legal classifications related 
to residency permits and citizenship are a salient administrative tool and contribute to forging 
symbolic boundaries within French society (Lamont 1992, 1995). These categories also have 
a complex history due in particular to France’s colonial history and convey not only legal 
rights but also ethnoracial connotations. 
French research on legal categories focuses predominantly on citizenship categories and the 
determinants of citizenship acquisition (Carillo 2015; Mazouz 2017; Simon 2012). Less 
attention has been paid to residency status and its consequences for socioeconomic 
integration. Yet, by opening up initial rights and opportunities and creating inequalities based 
on reasons for migrating, the state’s distribution of residency permits shapes later claims to 
national belonging and impacts immigrants’ potential integration. Prior to arriving in France, 
migrants must first obtain visas to enter the country legally, which are generally valid for 3 
months or up to one year. In the first few months of their stay and before their visa expires, 
migrants who wish to remain in France must apply for a residency permit (called titres de 
séjour) which enable legal settlement for a fixed period of time. 
The legislation governing titres de séjour has varied considerably over the last decades 
(Vaudano and Dahyot 2019). Generally, these permits differ by duration, income and housing 
requirements, proof of integration, right to work and access to citizenship (d’Albis and 
Boubtane 2015). Some statuses are intended for short-term stays. This is true of student 
permits, which are granted for one year and are renewable for the period of study, but do not 
open rights to long-term settlement. Students have recently been granted the right to work part 




time, but must justify enough resources to stay in France. Migrants with work permits are 
granted different duration rights based on the short-term or permanent nature of their 
employment contract. Persons entering France on the basis of family reunification permits 
must demonstrate adequate housing and sufficient income, and since the 2000s, proof of their 
cultural integration. Family migrants benefit from long-term residency rights and are allowed 
to work, although this right was not always guaranteed in previous decades. Despite tighter 
conditions in recent years, marriage permits most favorably open up the road toward 
citizenship with shorter eligibility requirements and lower rejection rates. Citizenship 
acquisition is considered a right for migrants who marry French citizens and is subject to an 
entirely different procedure (“naturalization by declaration”) than the standard track to 
citizenship (“naturalization by decree”). As concerns asylum seekers, the legislation has 
become increasingly strict in recent years as the number of persons seeking asylum has risen 
while the number admitted has dropped. Contexts of refugee reception have also varied 
considerably over time, from the more advantaged conditions governing the arrival of 
refugees from Southeast Asia in the 1970s to a less favorable context today (Bellot 2015; Spire 
2007). Asylum seekers are currently not guaranteed the right to work upon arrival and must 
wait 6 months before applying for a work permit. However, they are provided some financial 
aid and may receive help finding temporary housing during the application process. Refugee 
status also may allow for faster access to citizenship, as they do not need to fulfill the 5-year 
residency requirement before applying.  
In addition to objective differences relating to conditions and rights, some statuses may be 
viewed more or less favorably by the state. Workers may be seen as more desirable and with 
less suspicion than migrants coming to join their spouses or families, particularly since debates 
around immigration policy in the early 2000s increasingly pushed the distinction between 
“chosen immigration” (i.e. labor migration that benefits France and its economy) and 
“imposed immigration” (i.e. unwanted family reunification migrants and asylum seekers) 
(Lochak 2006).  
Finally, it is noteworthy that initial legal status is tightly linked to country of origin. As EU 
citizens benefiting from free circulation within the Schengen area, European origin migrants 
who arrived in France after 1999 do not require a residency permit to live, work and study in 
France. Due to their status as former colonies, special rules have governed the residency 
permits granted to Algerians, Tunisians, Moroccans, and migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Some other countries also benefit from bilateral agreements that affect the legal context of 
reception of their emigrants to France. 
 
III. Data and Measures 
We utilize data from Trajectories and Origins (TeO), a large-scale, diverse, and cross-
sectional survey of the French population collected between 2008 and 2009 (Beauchemin, 
Hamel and Simon 2018). TeO surveyed 21,761 respondents aged 18 to 60, covering 
immigrants to France, children of immigrants, those born in overseas départements and their 
children, and those born in France to French-born, non-migrant parents. We limit our analyses 





valid responses to questions regarding their legal status upon arrival and non-missing 
responses to our dependent and independent variables of interest. 
Outcome variables 
TeO contains detailed information on a variety of immigrant outcomes, including measures 
covering family income, unemployment status, spatial integration, and health status. Family 
income is divided into deciles according to the respondents’ household monthly income. 
Unemployment status is a binary variable measuring whether or not the respondent is currently 
unemployed. We examine two spatial integration measures at the level of the French census 
block (IRIS), neighborhood income disadvantage and neighborhood percent immigrant. 
Neighborhood income disadvantage measures household income per capita in the 
neighborhood of residence, coded in deciles indicating 1 for the highest household income per 
capita neighborhoods and 10 for the lowest income neighborhoods.  Neighborhood percent 
immigrant is measured in deciles (0-9), with higher values representing higher concentrations 
of immigrants in the respondents’ neighborhood of residence. Finally, self-rated health is a 
binary variable measuring whether the respondent reported being in very good or good health, 
compared with being in average, bad, or very bad health. 
Key explanatory variable 
Our key explanatory variable of interest is the respondents’ first residency permit obtained in 
France. The residency permit, or titre de séjour, is issued by the French police prefecture and 
gives migrants the right to settle legally in the country for a determined period of time. It is 
important to highlight that the residency permit is issued after arrival and is therefore distinct 
from the visa, which is issued prior to arrival and allows legal entry. To remain in France 
legally, migrants must apply for residency permits before the visa expires, typically within 
one year of arrival. TeO does not provide any information on the type of visa or whether the 
respondent arrived without a visa. Therefore, our data do not allow us to distinguish between 
respondents who entered the country with a visa and subsequently applied for a residency 
card, and those who entered without a visa and later regularized their situation. TeO does 
however report the year in which the first permit was obtained. In addition to the type of first 
residency permit, our models control for permit immediately upon arrival to measure whether 
respondents obtained their residency permit within a year of arriving in France or in later 
years. This allows us to potentially capture effects related to the regularization of migrants 
who arrived with no visa. 
We construct our measure of status upon arrival using TeO questions that ask for what reason 
their first permit was issued. Respondents were coded according to their stated reason for first 
residency permit: “Asylum,” “Student,” “Worker,” “Marriage to a French citizen,” or “Family 
reunification.” We exclude from our analysis migrants who stated that they were exempt by 
law from applying for a permit (N= 345), or who reported “Don’t know” (N=127), “Refused” 
(N=28), or “Other permit” (N=415) when asked the reason for their first permit. While 
respondents in these excluded categories (in particular those who reported “Don’t know” or 
“Refused”) may represent more legally vulnerable immigrants, including those who have yet 




to obtain a residency permit at the time of the survey, it is impossible to accurately determine 
the legal status of these respondents. Thus, any findings using these categories would difficult 
to interpret. Table 1 reports the distribution of the sample by first residency permit. The largest 
categories are work permit holders (31%), family reunification migrants (22%) and those 
entering on a French spouse permit (19%). 
 
Table 1: Sample by Legal Status  
 N Weighted % 
Asylum 623 12.09 
Student  606 16.91 
Worker 969 30.54 
French spouse 709 18.95 
Family reunification  782 21.51 
Total 3689 100 
 
Migrant selection variables 
TeO also covers a wealth of information on characteristics related to immigrant selection. We 
consider demographic characteristics including respondents’ gender, and whether or not the 
respondent self-identifies as Muslim. Respondents’ region of birth is a categorical variable 
coded as “North Africa,” “Sub-Saharan Africa,” “Southeast Asia,” “Turkey,” “Portugal,” 
“Spain/ Italy,” “Other European Union countries” and “Other.” These represent the largest 
immigrant origin groups in France. We also consider immigrants’ previous migration 
experience, a binary variable indicating whether the immigrant has ever lived outside of their 
country of birth for at least one year prior to their arrival in France. We examine whether 
respondents visited France for less than a year prior to their arrival using a binary indicator. 
In addition, we control for the respondents’ type of last job prior to migration, coded as “Never 
worked prior to migration,” “Worked an unskilled or unpaid job prior to migration,” or 
“Other.” Highest level of education prior to migration is coded as “Primary school or less” 
“Lower-secondary,” “Higher-secondary,” and “Higher education.” We consider respondents’ 
marital status prior to migration, a binary variable indicating whether the respondent reported 
being married prior to migration. We also examine an indicator variable measuring whether 
the respondent secured an employment contract in France prior to migration.  
We also consider several measures of respondents’ characteristics immediately upon their 
arrival in France. French proficiency upon arrival is coded into three categories, “Not at all,” 
“Some French,” “Very good comprehension and spoken French,” and “All very good.” We 
also consider respondents’ age at arrival and whether the respondent lived in temporary 
housing immediately upon arrival, such as in a housing center for asylum seekers, a hostel for 
migrant workers, or accommodations temporarily lent to them by family or friends rather than 





Current demographic characteristics 
Finally, we control for several variables reflecting respondents’ demographic characteristics 
at the time of TeO interview. We examine respondents’ current French citizenship status 
using a binary indicator measuring whether the respondent holds French citizenship at the 
time of the interview. Likewise, respondents’ current marital status is a binary variable 
measuring whether the respondent reported being married at the time of TeO collection. 
Current French proficiency is a categorical variable coded as “Not at all,” “Some French,” 
“Very good comprehension and spoken French,” and “All very good.” We also examine 
respondents’ highest level of education at the time of the survey, coded as “No diploma,” 
“Junior of vocational high school,” “Vocational or baccalaureate degree,” and “University 
degree.” Finally, current employment status is coded as “Employed,” “Student,” 





















Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by Initial Legal Status 
 





Outcomes       
Income (deciles) 4.69 7.48 6.20 5.34 4.50 5.39 
Unemployed 16% 9% 10% 14% 12% 12% 
Neighborhood disadvantage scale (0-27) 18.75 15.06 16.12 17.56 19.48 17.96 
Neighborhood percent immigrant (deciles) 8.12 7.70 7.61 7.45 7.96 8.04 
Reported good health 70% 91% 70% 80% 72% 77% 
       
Migrant selection       
Female 39% 46% 31% 72% 73% 43% 
Region of origin       
   North Africa 3% 33% 23% 38% 51% 33% 
   Sub-Saharan Africa 14% 16% 4% 10% 7% 15% 
   Southeast Asia 24% 1% 0% 1% 1% 1% 
   Turkey 11% 1% 4% 6% 14% 5% 
   Portugal 2% 1% 29% 2% 11% 9% 
   Spain/ Italy 0% 2% 6% 3% 1% 2% 
   EU27 7% 12% 21% 14% 3% 7% 
   Other 39% 34% 12% 27% 12% 27% 
Muslim 21% 38% 26% 48% 67% 44% 
Previous migration experience 21% 10% 13% 13% 5% 16% 
Visit France before migration 5% 36% 31% 29% 13% 24% 
Type of work in CoA       
   Never worked 43% 66% 24% 30% 61% 36% 





   Other 47% 31% 51% 58% 24% 48% 
Highest level of education before migration      
   Primary school or less 16% 1% 32% 12% 29% 21% 
   Lower-secondary 27% 3% 21% 19% 29% 20% 
   Higher-secondary 35% 13% 23% 34% 30% 37% 
   Higher education 21% 83% 24% 34% 12% 22% 
Married before migration 37% 8% 31% 71% 67% 32% 
Employment contract before arrival 1% 3% 30% 1% 1% 6% 
French proficiency on arrival       
   Not at all 47% 10% 34% 21% 31% 30% 
   Some French 40% 32% 44% 47% 49% 40% 
   Very good comprehension and spoken 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 1% 
   All very good 13% 57% 21% 30% 18% 29% 
Age at arrival 26.34 23.06 25.08 28.07 24.16 25.49 
Initial housing temporary 39% 10% 18% 4% 6% 14% 
       
Current demographics       
French citizenship 50% 48% 22% 42% 24% 36% 
Married 79% 75% 79% 84% 82% 83% 
Current French ability       
   Not at all 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 
   Some French 62% 11% 48% 42% 58% 43% 
   Very good comprehension and spoken 9% 6% 17% 12% 11% 12% 
   All very good 28% 83% 35% 46% 30% 45% 
Years in France 18.11 16.86 22.05 11.79 16.21 17.69 
Education level       
   No diploma 32% 3% 32% 22% 41% 31% 
   Junior or vocational high school 25% 4% 30% 26% 37% 28% 
   Vocational or regular bac 22% 11% 14% 22% 11% 19% 




   University 21% 82% 24% 30% 11% 21% 
Current employment status       
   Employed 68% 81% 78% 58% 54% 74% 
   Student 1% 2% 0% 0% 1% 0% 
   Unemployed 16% 9% 10% 14% 12% 12% 
   Retired/ stay at home 11% 6% 6% 26% 32% 9% 
   Other 5% 1% 6% 1% 2% 5% 






3.1.  Plan of analyses  
 
We present our analyses across three nested regression models for each outcome of interest 
(family income, unemployment status, neighborhood income disadvantage, neighborhood 
percent immigrant, and self-rated health). We compare all other migrants to family 
reunification permit holders, one of the largest entry status groups in France in recent decades 
(Noiriel 1992; d’Albis and Boubtane 2018). Model 1 presents the effects of immigrants’ legal 
status at entry prior to immigrant selection and current demographic controls. Model 2 
expands on Model 1 to account for immigrant selection by including variables measuring 
respondents’ region of birth, gender, religious identification, previous migration experience, 
visits to France prior to arrival, type of last job prior to migration, highest level of education 
prior to migration, marital status prior to migration, employment contract prior to arrival, 
residency permit upon arrival, French proficiency upon arrival, age at arrival, and temporary 
housing upon arrival. Finally, Model 3 adds current demographic characteristics (citizenship 
status, marital status, French proficiency, and highest level of education at the time of the 
survey) to Model 2 to determine whether differences in outcomes by status at entry persist 
after accounting for all migrant selection and current demographic characteristics. We also 
apply interactions between initial legal status and immigrants’ region of origin to Model 3 to 
examine whether possessing a disadvantaged status at entry may impact certain immigrants 
more than others. We run ordinary least squares regressions when examining family income, 
neighborhood income disadvantage, and neighborhood percent immigrant, while we run 
logistic regressions to predict unemployment status and self-rated health. Results are 
presented as marginal effects tables or graphs to ease interpretation. Full model results are 




Descriptive comparisons in Table 2 suggest strong evidence of differential selection into 
immigrant legal status categories based on demographic, pre-migration and upon-arrival 
characteristics. In particular, those whose initial status was a student permit appear to be the 
most socioeconomically advantaged prior to and upon arrival in France, while those with 
asylum permits appear the least advantaged. Respondents with student permits are by far the 
most highly educated prior to migration. 81% of respondents in this category obtained higher 
education prior to arrival in France. By contrast, only 33% of those whose initial status was a 
spousal permit, the second mostly highly educated group, obtained higher education before 
entering France. Those who held work and family reunification permits reported the lowest 
levels of education prior to migration, with over half of respondents in both groups attaining 
lower secondary schooling or less. Likewise, student permit holders have the highest levels of 
French proficiency upon arrival. Only 11% of student permit holders reported speaking 
French “not at all” upon arrival in France, compared to 46% of asylum permit holders. 




Those who held student permits were also the most likely to have never worked prior to 
migration (66%), and the least likely to have worked an unskilled or unpaid job (3%). By 
contrast, only 26% of those with work permits had not worked prior to migration, and 23% of 
them had worked in an unskilled or unpaid job. Only the work permit category had a 
substantial proportion of respondents with a work contract prior to arrival in France (24%). 
Student permit holders were also the least likely to have been married prior to migration (7%), 
compared to 66% of those whose first permit was for family reunification and 61% of those 
with spousal permits. French spouse and Family reunification permit holders were the least 
likely to reside in temporary housing immediately upon arrival (6% and 7%, respectively), 
while Asylum permit holders were the most (37%). 
Socioeconomic integration 
Table 3: Effects of Initial Legal Status on Socioeconomic Integration 
(Reference Category : Family Reunification) 
 Family Income Unemployment Status 
 Model 1 Model 2i Model 3ii Model 1 Model 2i Model 3ii 
       
Asylum 0.194 -0.500** -0.559*** 0.0379 0.0147 0.0180 
 (0.208) (0.233) (0.202) (0.0287) (0.0319) (0.0318) 
Student 2.985*** 1.291*** 0.924*** -0.0319 -0.0449 -0.0402 
 (0.188) (0.224) (0.202) (0.0224) (0.0275) (0.0277) 
Worker 1.696*** 0.260 0.202 -0.0219 -0.0255 -0.0278 
 (0.181) (0.204) (0.182) (0.0214) (0.0260) (0.0254) 
French spouse 0.837*** 0.165 0.0576 0.0164 0.00875 0.0203 
 (0.193) (0.193) (0.179) (0.0244) (0.0269) (0.0272) 
No permit 0.888*** 0.217 0.0407 -0.00235 -0.0248 -0.0195 
 (0.184) (0.190) (0.168) (0.0223) (0.0248) (0.0246) 
       
Observations 3,689 3,689 3,689 3,689 3,689 3,689 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
i Controlling for: region of birth, gender, religious identification, previous migration experience, visits to France 
prior to arrival, type of last job prior to migration, highest level of education prior to migration, marital status 
prior to migration, employment contract prior to arrival, French proficiency upon arrival, age at arrival, 
temporary housing upon arrival 
ii Controlling for: region of birth, gender, religious identification, previous migration experience, visits to France 
prior to arrival, type of last job prior to migration, highest level of education prior to migration, marital status 
prior to migration, employment contract prior to arrival, French proficiency upon arrival, age at arrival, 
temporary housing upon arrival, current citizenship status, current marital status, current French proficiency, 






Table 3 presents the marginal effects of legal status at entry on immigrants’ socioeconomic 
integration. Prior to controlling for selection and current demographic variables, those with 
student permits, work permits, and spousal permits all reported higher family income relative 
to those who first possessed family reunification permits. Upon the inclusion of selection 
controls however, this advantage relative to family reunification permit holders loses 
statistical significance for those entering with a work permit or French spouse permit, and is 
greatly reduced, but still statistically significant, for student permit holders. Likewise, net of 
selection controls, asylum permit holders, for whom there had been no statistically significant 
difference in family income with family reunification permit holders in Model 1, now report 
significantly lower family income relative to family reunification permit holders. Finally, in 
the full model with both selection and current demographic controls, the family income gap 
between asylum permit holders and family reunification permit holders persists, while student 
permit holders continue to report significantly higher family income relative to family 
reunification permit holders. By contrast, we find few statistically significant differences in 
the marginal effects of initial legal status on immigrants’ probability of being unemployed at 
the time of TeO collection. 
Table 1 of the Appendix demonstrate that immigrants’ socioeconomic outcomes are 
significantly shaped by their pre-migration characteristics, even net of present-day 
demographics. Pre-migration work experience matters for immigrants’ socioeconomic 
attainment: those who worked a salaried job in their country of ancestry report higher family 
income relative to those who have never worked or who worked an unskilled or unsalaried 
job. Likewise, immigrants who received higher education in their countries of origin, had an 
employment contract prior arrival, who had previously visited France, do not identify as 
Muslim, or who were unmarried prior to migration report higher family income. There are 
significant national origin disparities in family income. North African immigrants are 
disadvantaged relative to Southeast Asian, Turkish, Portuguese, Spanish, Italian, other 
European Union, and other origin immigrants. Similar patterns linked to national origin are 
found for unemployment: relative to North African immigrants, Turkish, Portuguese, Spanish, 
Italian, and other origin immigrants are less likely to be unemployed. Present-day 
unemployment rates are also higher for those who lived in temporary housing immediately 












Table 4: Effects of Initial Legal Status on Spatial Integration 
(Reference Category : Family Reunification) 
 Neighborhood Disadvantage Neighborhood % Immigrant
 Model 1 Model 2i Model 3ii Model 1 Model 2i Model 3ii 
       
Asylum -0.725 0.411 0.522 0.161 0.243 0.274* 
 (0.444) (0.506) (0.514) (0.129) (0.150) (0.153) 
Student -4.417*** -1.922*** -1.513*** -0.264** 0.0394 0.0885 
 (0.389) (0.451) (0.459) (0.117) (0.144) (0.144) 
Worker -3.356*** -1.285*** -1.125** -0.348*** 0.121 0.138 
 (0.375) (0.441) (0.441) (0.111) (0.131) (0.133) 
French spouse -1.918*** -0.654 -0.595 -0.514*** -0.358*** -0.311** 
 (0.417) (0.412) (0.416) (0.128) (0.130) (0.128) 
No permit -1.518*** -0.516 -0.334 0.0785 0.230** 0.265** 
 (0.383) (0.387) (0.389) (0.103) (0.113) (0.112) 
       
Observations 3,689 3,689 3,689 3,689 3,689 3,689 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
i Controlling for: region of birth, gender, religious identification, previous migration experience, visits to France 
prior to arrival, type of last job prior to migration, highest level of education prior to migration, marital status 
prior to migration, employment contract prior to arrival, French proficiency upon arrival, age at arrival, 
temporary housing upon arrival 
ii Controlling for: region of birth, gender, religious identification, previous migration experience, visits to France 
prior to arrival, type of last job prior to migration, highest level of education prior to migration, marital status 
prior to migration, employment contract prior to arrival, French proficiency upon arrival, age at arrival, 
temporary housing upon arrival, current citizenship status, current marital status, current French proficiency, 
current highest educational attainment; current employment status, years resided in France 
The marginal effects of initial status on immigrants’ spatial integration are shown in Table 4. 
Compared to those whose first permit was for family reunification, those with a student, 
worker, or spouse permit live in neighborhoods scoring lower on the neighborhood income 
disadvantage scale. However, the advantage reported by respondents with a spousal permit 
loses statistical significance after controlling for migrant selection variables. Meanwhile, the 
neighborhood income advantage reported by student and work permit holders relative to 
family reunification permit holders persists even after the inclusion of both selection and 
current demographic variables. 
Furthermore, those with student, work, or spousal permits live in neighborhoods with 
significantly lower proportions of immigrants relative to those entering under a family 
reunification permit. Upon the inclusion of selection controls, however, only those whose first 





significantly lower proportion of immigrants, while those with asylum permits now report 
living in neighborhoods with a significantly higher proportion of immigrants. These effects 
remain after the inclusion of current demographic controls. 
Net of present-day demographic controls, women, those who visited France prior to migration, 
who completed higher education in their sending states, who do not identify as Mulsim, or 
who lived in stable housing immediately upon arrival report living in higher income 
neighborhoods. Likewise, North African immigrants report living in lower income 
neighborhoods relative to Southeast Asian, Turkish, Portuguese, Spanish, Italian, other 
European Union, and other origin immigrants. Southeast Asian immigrants are also more 
likely to live in neighborhoods with higher concentrations of immigrants relative to North 
African immigrants, while Portuguese, Spanish, Italian, and other European immigrants live 
in neighborhoods with lower immigrant concentrations. Those who identify as Muslim, never 
worked in their country of origin, only completed primary school education or less prior to 
migration, received their residence permit after their year of arrival, or had very good speaking 
and comprehension of French upon arrival (relative to very good proficiency in all areas, 
including reading and writing French) likewise report living in more immigrant-dense 
neighborhoods. 
Self-rated health 
Table 5: Effects of Initial Legal Status on Self-Rated Health  
(Reference Category : Family Reunification) 
 Model 1 Model 2i Model 3ii 
    
Asylum -0.0201 -0.0687** -0.0329 
 (0.0329) (0.0350) (0.0334) 
Student 0.181*** -0.000464 0.00744 
 (0.0242) (0.0340) (0.0327) 
Worker -0.0287 -0.0704** -0.0246 
 (0.0282) (0.0279) (0.0261) 
French spouse 0.0759*** 0.00865 -0.00332 
 (0.0294) (0.0256) (0.0255) 
No permit 0.0490* -0.0183 0.00857 
 (0.0271) (0.0246) (0.0232) 
    
Observations 3,689 3,689 3,689 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
i Controlling for: region of birth, gender, religious identification, previous migration experience, visits to France 
prior to arrival, type of last job prior to migration, highest level of education prior to migration, marital status 
prior to migration, employment contract prior to arrival, French proficiency upon arrival, age at arrival, 
temporary housing upon arrival 




ii Controlling for: region of birth, gender, religious identification, previous migration experience, visits to France 
prior to arrival, type of last job prior to migration, highest level of education prior to migration, marital status 
prior to migration, employment contract prior to arrival, French proficiency upon arrival, age at arrival, 
temporary housing upon arrival, current citizenship status, current marital status, current French proficiency, 
current highest educational attainment; current employment status, years resided in France 
Table 5 displays the marginal effects of status at entry on immigrants’ self-rated health. Prior 
to the inclusion of selection and current demographic controls, respondents with a student or 
spouse permit were more likely relative to those whose first permit was for family 
reunification to report “good” or “very good” health. However, the health advantage exhibited 
by these respondents loses statistical significance with the inclusion of migrant selection 
variables. By contrast, a negative effect for those with an asylum or work permit emerges after 
holding constant migrant selection. Nevertheless, all differences between those with a family 
reunification permit and those with other legal categories as their first permit lose statistical 
significance when current demographic controls are added in Model 3. Male immigrants, 
those who arrived in France at younger ages, those who visited France before migration, and 
those from other European Union countries are more likely to report being in good health 
relatively to females, older immigrant, those who never visited France prior to migration, and 
North African immigrants. 
Differential effects of disadvantaged legal status 







Our final analysis explores whether the effect of legal status is similar for all origin groups. 
Figure 1 plots the marginal effects on income from the model including an interaction between 
legal status and country of origin to our full models. We classify immigrants entering under 
family reunification or asylum as having a “disadvantaged” status. To obtain parsimonious 
interaction effects and statistical power, we grouped categories that showed similar patterns 
in prior analyses. Results show that not all groups are significantly impacted by legal status at 
entry. Negative effects of disadvantaged status on income are only found for migrants 
originating from Sub-Saharan Africa and other non-European countries. A similar pattern is 
observed for the spatial outcomes, illustrated in Figure 2. Migrants from other non-European 
countries live in lower income neighborhoods when they have a disadvantaged legal status 
compared to immigrants of the same origin with an advantaged legal status. Further, Sub-
Saharan African origin migrants and those from other countries live in neighborhoods with 
higher immigrant shares. Interactions were also tested for the unemployment and health 
outcomes but did not produce significant results. 
Figure 2: Marginal Effects of Disadvantage Status on Neighborhood Disadvantage and 
Segregation by Origin  
 
Conclusion 
Immigrants’ initial legal status categories open up differential rights to work, study, reside, 
and petition for citizenship in their receiving states, with long term implications for their 
integration trajectories. However, immigrants are not randomly assigned to legal categories 




upon entry, but are differentially selected into their initial statuses on the basis of pre-
migration characteristics. Previous research examining the effects of immigrants’ legal status 
upon entry on their integration trajectories have not given in-depth consideration to the pre-
migration characteristics that shape selection into migrants’ initial legal categories. As a result, 
we know little about whether the differential outcomes observed across immigrants’ initial 
legal status are simply a reflection of their pre-migration characteristics and selectivity, or 
whether they persist net of pre-migration sorting into legal categories at entry. 
This project takes the first step towards addressing this question using the Trajectories and 
Origins survey, a unique French data source covering both migrants’ legal status upon entry 
and detailed information on their pre-migration characteristics. We find that while those 
entering France under student, worker, or spousal permits initially report better outcomes 
relative to those entering with family reunification, asylum, or no permit, much of these 
differences disappear or diminish with the inclusion of pre-migration selection variables. 
Immigrants who report better socioeconomic, spatial integration, and health outcomes in 
France tend to be more positively selected. They report having salaried work and higher levels 
of education in their country of origin, visiting France or having an employment contract prior 
to arrival, and being highly proficient in French or living in stable housing immediately upon 
arrival. 
However,  some initial status differences in immigrant outcomes persist even after controlling 
for both pre-migration characteristics and present-day sociodemographics, including French 
citizenship status, socioeconomic attainment, and French proficiency at the time of survey 
completion. Net of these controls, immigrants who enter under as students report higher 
family income, while immigrants entering as asylum seekers report lower family income 
relative to those entering France under a family reunification permit. Likewise, those who 
enter with student or worker permits report living in higher income neighborhoods. Relative 
to family reunification permit holders, those who possessed asylum permits live in areas that 
have a higher immigrant concentration, while those entering with a spousal permit live in 
areas that have a lower immigrant concentration. We found no significant association between 
initial legal status and migrants’ unemployment or health outcomes. 
How can we explain the persistent effects of immigrants’ initial legal status? In theorizing the 
effects of naturalization for immigrant integration, Bloemraad (2017) argues that citizenship 
may promote immigrants’ wellbeing through several mechanisms. Citizens may access 
exclusive status-based rights, resources, and benefits that may not be available to noncitizens, 
including the rights to vote in national elections and reside indefinitely in a state. Acquiring 
citizenship may imbue immigrants with social legitimacy and signal to other state residents 
the immigrants’ integration and commitment to their host country. Furthermore, naturalization 
may matter for immigrant outcomes through shaping their human and social capital 
investments and socialization in their host countries. Below, we apply this framework to 
consider the rights-, meaning-, and socialization-based mechanisms through which 





Immigrants’ initial residence permits define administrative and legal pathways in their 
integration process, creating a path-dependency with significant implications for their long-
term outcomes. For example, while those who possess work permits are eligible to work 
immediately upon securing their permit, other migrants may face legal and bureaucratic 
hurdles to securing the right to employment in France. The administrative procedure for 
asylum seekers is long and migrants are not permitted to apply for a work permit prior to six 
months of arrival, likely rendering labor market integration more difficult (d’Albis and 
Boubtane 2018). Thus, the spatial income advantage reported by work permit holders relative 
to asylum and family reunification permit holders may be due in part to their ability to 
immediately integrate into the French labor market. Likewise, those who obtain residency 
permits for marriage to a French citizen enjoy unique naturalization privileges, including the 
option to naturalize “by declaration,” shorter residency requirements, and lower rates of 
rejection. Such facilitated access to French citizenship may promote French spouse permit 
holders’ residential integration with French natives that we find in this article.  
However, our empirical findings do not completely mirror the status-based differences in 
migrants’ access to rights and resources. In particular, we find that asylum seekers report 
relative disadvantage in their family income and spatial segregation outcomes net of pre-
migration selection variables. On the one hand, this category may be relatively “legally 
privileged,” as asylees may have benefited from specific integration programs and state aid, 
such as that granted to refugees from Southeast Asia who arrived in France in the 1970s. These 
migrants were accompanied by a favorable policy of reception and integration coordinated by 
both the state and humanitarian associations (Bellot 2015), benefiting from reception at the 
airport, temporary and later permanent housing as well the right to work immediately and 
indefinitely. However, the social stigma and meaning attached to asylum seekers in France 
has transformed over time, along with the rise of anti-foreigner sentiment, immigration 
restrictions, and changes in migrant flows starting in the 1980s, with more asylum seekers 
coming from African or Middle Eastern countries. Seen as less “desirable” or even 
“unassimilable” (mainly for those who are perceived as Muslims), these “new asylum 
seekers” make up the majority of the asylum permit holders analyzed in this article (nearly 
80% of the asylum permit recipients in our sample arrived after 1980, and over 40% arrived 
after 1990). Furthermore, while education- and work-based residence permits do not 
guarantee long-term residence in France or a pathway to French citizenship, these statuses 
may signal a more favorably-received “chosen” status in contrast to the “imposed” status of 
family reunification and asylum seekers (Lochak 2006). These differential social connotations 
attached to migrant’s status at entry may push asylum seekers into more segregated and 
disadvantaged neighborhoods and hinder their labor-market activities, while expediting the 
economic and residential integration of student and work-permit holders. 
Furthermore, migrants’ initial legal status may set them upon diverging socialization tracks, 
with implications for their long-term wellbeing. Migrants granted residence permits to marry 
French citizens may experience facilitated socialization into French culture, language, and 
society, reflected in their reduced spatial segregation (Iceland and Nelson 2010). Likewise, 
immigrants are typically granted student permits to pursue higher education in France, and 
thus gain exposure to privileged French institutions. Exposure to such institutions also 




provides immigrants with opportunities to form advantageous social ties, particularly with 
regards to intermarriage with highly-educated French citizens and natives. For example, while 
only 7% of student permit holders in our sample are married prior to migration, 77% of these 
respondents are married by the time of the survey (Table 2). Further analyses (available upon 
request) show that among student permit holders married at the time of TeO collection, 77% 
had a French citizen spouse and 54% had a native-born spouse, the group with the second-
highest proportion of marriage to a French citizen or native-born after spousal permit holders. 
By contrast, only 37% of married family reunification permit holders are married to a French 
citizen and 13% have a native-born spouse at the time of TeO collection. Finally, 57% of 
spouses of initial student permit holders had more than two years of higher education, 
compared to only 8% of spouses of family reunification migrants. Thus, migrants’ initial legal 
categories funnel them into diverse institutions and social environments in their receiving 
state, with consequences for their socialization and integration.  
Finally, a disadvantaged initial legal status matters more for some immigrant groups relative 
to others. Status distinctions did not appear to be as powerful for European immigrants. In 
contrast, Sub-Saharan African and other non-European origins with asylum or family 
reunification faired worse on socioeconomic and spatial outcomes relative to other categories. 
African immigrants and other visible minorities face high levels of discrimination in France 
(Beauchemin et al. 2010, Safi and Simon 2013). As Beaman (2017) argues, status citizenship 
often does not confer equal benefits of social membership upon the children of North African 
minorities in France, who may be denied “cultural citizenship” on the basis of ethnic 
boundaries. Just as status citizenship may signal social integration to employers (Bloemraad 
and Sheares 2017), possessing a disadvantaged legal status upon entry may be doubly 
stigmatizing for minority groups who already face social exclusion in France due to their 
ethnic background. 
This study nonetheless presents some limitations that future research could aim to overcome. 
Migrants’ initial legal status effects may reflect individual heterogeneity not captured by the 
pre-migration and immigrant selectivity variables included in our models, including migrants’ 
motivations for migration.  For example, while economic migrants largely base their decisions 
to migrate on their earning potential in the receiving state, family reunification migrants may 
be motivated by non-economic factors (Chiswick, Lee, and Miller 2005). These differences 
in motivations for migration may contribute to work-based permit holders neighborhood 
income advantage over family-reunification migrants, although we found no significant 
difference in family income between these groups net of controls. Likewise, we are unable to 
measure the political and economic circumstances in migrants’ country of origin leading up 
their departure. Refugees and others experiencing forced migration may enter France having 
endured persecution and traumatic experiences in their sending state that influence their 
migration preparedness and experiences of psychological distress, with implications for their 
socioeconomic trajectories (Akresh 2008; Torres and Wallace 2013). 
Moreover, while our research design allows for a temporal dimension as we measure the legal 
status upon entry and pre-migration characteristics on subsequent long-term socioeconomic 





Longitudinal data may thus focus on the role of post-migration trajectories by exploring how 
citizenship, experience of discrimination or intermarriage after arrival mediate the link 
between initial legal status and current outcomes. Finally, this article looks at the long-term 
effects of legal categories for migrants’ trajectories, but extensions of this research could 
investigate whether parental legal status or citizenship acquisition goes on to impact second 
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Table 1: Initial Legal Status on Family Income 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Legal status at entry (ref: family reunification)    
Asylum 0.194 -0.500** -0.559*** 
 (0.208) (0.233) (0.202) 
Student 2.985*** 1.291*** 0.924*** 
 (0.188) (0.224) (0.202) 
Worker 1.696*** 0.260 0.202 
 (0.181) (0.204) (0.182) 
French spouse 0.837*** 0.165 0.0576 
 (0.193) (0.193) (0.179) 
No permit 0.888*** 0.217 0.0407 
 (0.184) (0.190) (0.168) 
 
Immigrant selectivity 
   
Previous migration experience  0.177 0.230 
  (0.151) (0.142) 
Visited France before migration  0.317** 0.227* 
  (0.134) (0.123) 
Type of work in CoA (ref: salaried work)    
   Never worked  -0.402*** -0.262** 
  (0.126) (0.120) 
   Worked unskilled or unpaid  -0.406*** -0.259* 
  (0.156) (0.142) 
Highest education level in CoA (ref: higher education)    
   Primary school or less  -1.493*** -0.112 
  (0.184) (0.248) 
   Lower-secondary  -1.438*** -0.357 
  (0.160) (0.231) 
   Higher-secondary  -1.086*** -0.335* 
  (0.156) (0.192) 
Married before migration  -0.189 -0.211* 
  (0.129) (0.118) 
French proficiency on arrival    
    Not at all  -0.662*** -0.174 
  (0.187) (0.199) 
    Other  -0.205 0.0207 
   (0.143) (0.152) 
    Very good comprehension and spoken  -0.823** -0.517 
  (0.413) (0.393) 
Age at arrival  -0.0373*** -0.0333*** 
  (0.00904) (0.00902) 
Employment contract before arrival  0.623*** 0.654*** 
  (0.188) (0.168) 
Temporary housing  -0.491*** -0.406*** 
  (0.151) (0.135) 
Region of origin (ref: North Africa)    
   Sub-Saharan Africa  -0.274 -0.284* 
  (0.191) (0.167) 
   Southeast Asia  1.136*** 0.936*** 
  (0.288) (0.253) 
   Turkey  0.517** 0.314 





Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  (0.201) (0.193) 
   Portugal  1.745*** 1.401*** 
  (0.261) (0.243) 
   Spain/ Italy  1.395*** 1.286*** 
  (0.321) (0.284) 
   Other European Union countries  1.303*** 1.073*** 
  (0.259) (0.224) 
   Other regions  0.623*** 0.410** 
  (0.200) (0.183) 
Female  -0.265** 0.0854 
  (0.111) (0.107) 
Muslim  -0.716*** -0.620*** 
  (0.163) (0.148) 
 
Socio-demographics at the time of outcome 
French citizenship 
   
0.336*** 
   (0.108) 
Marital status   0.466*** 
   (0.127) 
French proficiency (ref: very good speaking, compre-
hension, reading and writing)  
   
   Not at all   0.171 
   (0.634) 
   Other   -0.289* 
   (0.148) 
   Very good comprehension and spoken   -0.141 
   (0.175) 
Years in France   -0.0166*** 
   (0.00551) 
Highest level of education (ref: no degree)    
   Junior or vocational high school   0.303** 
   (0.129) 
   Vocational or Regular Baccalaureate    0.751*** 
   (0.200) 
   University   1.358*** 
   (0.241) 
Current employment status (ref: working)    
   Student   -2.759*** 
   (0.499) 
   Unemployed   -2.384*** 
   (0.142) 
   Not working   -1.469*** 
   (0.152) 
   Other   -1.691*** 
   (0.227) 
Constant 4.499*** 7.593*** 6.423*** 
 (0.134) (0.365) (0.441) 
    
Observations 3,689 3,689 3,689 





Table 2: Initial Legal Status on Probability of Unemployment 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Legal status at entry (ref: family reunification)    
Asylum 0.313 0.125 0.157 
 (0.234) (0.270) (0.275) 
Student -0.336 -0.471 -0.429 
 (0.236) (0.287) (0.296) 
Worker -0.221 -0.247 -0.282 
 (0.212) (0.249) (0.254) 
French spouse 0.144 0.0758 0.176 
 (0.215) (0.233) (0.235) 
No permit -0.0220 -0.240 -0.192 
 (0.208) (0.234) (0.238) 
 
Immigrant selectivity 
   
Previous migration experience  0.303 0.367* 
  (0.189) (0.194) 
Visited France before migration  0.162 0.155 
  (0.167) (0.169) 
Type of work in CoA (ref: salaried work)    
   Never worked  0.0691 0.0594 
  (0.152) (0.157) 
   Worked unskilled or unpaid  0.290 0.265 
  (0.192) (0.192) 
Highest education level in CoA (ref: higher education)    
   Primary school or less  -0.139 -0.221 
  (0.238) (0.348) 
   Lower-secondary  -0.0468 -0.0852 
  (0.205) (0.320) 
   Higher-secondary  0.204 0.176 
  (0.176) (0.270) 
Married before migration  -0.317** -0.246 
  (0.160) (0.166) 
French proficiency on arrival    
    Not at all  0.604** 0.534* 
  (0.241) (0.279) 
    Other  -0.0294 -0.111 
   (0.192) (0.226) 
    Very good comprehension and spoken  0.832 0.625 
  (0.558) (0.513) 
Age at arrival  0.0184* 0.0176 
  (0.0106) (0.0116) 
Employment contract before arrival  0.254 0.259 
  (0.228) (0.227) 
Temporary housing  0.386** 0.431** 
  (0.164) (0.168) 
Region of origin (ref: North Africa)    
   Sub-Saharan Africa   0.354 0.301 
  (0.224) (0.232) 
   Southeast Asia  -0.568 -0.496 
  (0.349) (0.365) 
   Turkey  -0.706*** -0.692** 
  (0.265) (0.272) 
   Portugal  -1.135*** -1.168*** 




  (0.372) (0.383) 
   Spain/ Italy  -0.860 -0.979* 
  (0.543) (0.544) 
   Other European Union countries  -0.260 -0.301 
  (0.323) (0.323) 
   Other regions  -0.380* -0.388* 
  (0.216) (0.219) 
Female  0.103 0.0711 
  (0.135) (0.138) 
Muslim  0.182 0.227 
  (0.171) (0.172) 
 
Socio-demographics at the time of outcome 
   
French citizenship   -0.347** 
   (0.144) 
Marital status   -0.656*** 
   (0.154) 
French proficiency (ref: very good speaking, comprehen-
sion, reading and writing)  
   
   Not at all   -0.207 
   (1.186) 
   Other   0.0888 
   (0.204) 
   Very good comprehension and spoken   0.321 
   (0.239) 
Years in France   0.00506 
   (0.00742) 
Highest level of education (ref: no degree)    
   Junior or vocational high school   -0.0677 
   (0.185) 
   Vocational or Regular Baccalaureate    0.00255 
   (0.260) 
   University   -0.00734 
   (0.324) 
Constant -1.965*** -2.545*** -2.015*** 
 (0.160) (0.425) (0.565) 
    
Observations 3,689 3,689 3,689 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 











Table 3: Initial Legal Status on Neighborhood Income Disadvantage 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Legal status at entry (ref: family reunification)    
Asylum -0.725 0.411 0.522 
 (0.444) (0.506) (0.514) 
Student -4.417*** -1.922*** -1.513*** 
 (0.389) (0.451) (0.459) 
Worker -3.356*** -1.285*** -1.125** 
 (0.375) (0.441) (0.441) 
French spouse -1.918*** -0.654 -0.595 
 (0.417) (0.412) (0.416) 
No permit -1.518*** -0.516 -0.334 
 (0.383) (0.387) (0.389) 
 
Immigrant selectivity 
   
Previous migration experience  -0.452 -0.495 
  (0.358) (0.355) 
Visited France before migration  -1.066*** -1.039*** 
  (0.303) (0.300) 
Type of work in CoA (ref: salaried work)    
   Never worked  0.495* 0.457 
  (0.290) (0.291) 
   Worked unskilled or unpaid  0.575 0.459 
  (0.367) (0.366) 
Highest education level in CoA (ref: higher education)    
   Primary school or less  2.032*** 1.102* 
  (0.429) (0.608) 
   Lower-secondary  1.869*** 0.931 
  (0.383) (0.566) 
   Higher-secondary  1.260*** 0.456 
  (0.336) (0.473) 
Married before migration  0.207 0.259 
  (0.285) (0.285) 
French proficiency on arrival    
    Not at all  0.556 0.00440 
  (0.396) (0.481) 
    Other  0.237 -0.0988 
   (0.307) (0.381) 
    Very good comprehension and spoken  -0.0737 -0.577 
  (0.848) (0.945) 
Age at arrival  0.0601*** 0.0364 
  (0.0210) (0.0227) 
Employment contract before arrival  0.106 0.109 
  (0.446) (0.447) 
Temporary housing  0.924*** 0.836** 
  (0.338) (0.332) 
Region of origin (ref: North Africa)    
   Sub-Saharan Africa  0.681 0.527 
  (0.418) (0.416) 
   Southeast Asia  -1.612*** -1.386** 
  (0.617) (0.615) 
   Turkey  -0.203 -0.216 
  (0.448) (0.455) 




   Portugal  -3.246*** -3.042*** 
  (0.602) (0.606) 
   Spain/ Italy  -2.453*** -2.285*** 
  (0.719) (0.724) 
   Other European Union countries  -2.512*** -2.350*** 
  (0.548) (0.542) 
   Other regions  -1.727*** -1.605*** 
  (0.439) (0.438) 
Female  -0.437* -0.569** 
  (0.252) (0.265) 
Muslim  1.771*** 1.618*** 
  (0.346) (0.345) 
 
Socio-demographics at the time of outcome 
French citizenship 
   
-0.280 
   (0.268) 
Marital status   -0.281 
   (0.301) 
French proficiency (ref: very good speaking, comprehen-
sion, reading and writing)  
   
   Not at all   -0.767 
   (1.779) 
   Other   0.480 
   (0.379) 
   Very good comprehension and spoken   0.269 
   (0.453) 
Years in France   -0.0193 
   (0.0139) 
Highest level of education (ref: no degree)    
   Junior or vocational high school   -0.133 
   (0.326) 
   Vocational or Regular Baccalaureate    -0.475 
   (0.465) 
   University   -1.245** 
   (0.569) 
Current employment status (ref: working)    
   Student   -0.208 
   (1.344) 
   Unemployed   2.120*** 
   (0.311) 
   Not working   0.458 
   (0.368) 
   Other   0.916 
   (0.663) 
Constant 19.48*** 15.59*** 17.59*** 
 (0.253) (0.830) (1.116) 
    
Observations 3,689 3,689 3,689 
R-squared 0.058 0.191 0.207 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 






Table 4: Initial Legal Status on Neighborhood Percent Immigrant  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Legal status at entry (ref: family reunification)    
Asylum 0.161 0.243 0.274* 
 (0.129) (0.150) (0.153) 
Student -0.264** 0.0394 0.0885 
 (0.117) (0.144) (0.144) 
Worker -0.348*** 0.121 0.138 
 (0.111) (0.131) (0.133) 
French spouse -0.514*** -0.358*** -0.311** 
 (0.128) (0.130) (0.128) 
No permit 0.0785 0.230** 0.265** 
 (0.103) (0.113) (0.112) 
 
Immigrant selectivity 
   
Previous migration experience  -0.0824 -0.0621 
  (0.100) (0.0997) 
Visited France before migration  -0.0936 -0.101 
  (0.0951) (0.0943) 
Type of work in CoA (ref: salaried work)    
   Never worked  0.219*** 0.230*** 
  (0.0839) (0.0836) 
   Worked unskilled or unpaid  0.0354 0.0200 
  (0.104) (0.103) 
Highest education level in CoA (ref: higher education)    
   Primary school or less  2.032*** 1.102* 
  (0.429) (0.608) 
   Lower-secondary  1.869*** 0.931 
  (0.383) (0.566) 
   Higher-secondary  1.260*** 0.456 
  (0.336) (0.473) 
Married before migration  0.0149 0.0574 
  (0.0826) (0.0829) 
French proficiency on arrival    
    Not at all  -0.0748 -0.0584 
  (0.127) (0.144) 
    Other  0.0459 0.0678 
   (0.0945) (0.114) 
    Very good comprehension and spoken  0.497** 0.568** 
  (0.220) (0.236) 
Age at arrival  0.0174*** 0.00926 
  (0.00561) (0.00621) 
Employment contract before arrival  -0.181 -0.162 
  (0.139) (0.138) 
Temporary housing  -0.0746 -0.0674 
  (0.108) (0.107) 
Region of origin (ref: North Africa)    
   Sub-Saharan Africa  0.233** 0.155 
  (0.109) (0.107) 
   Southeast Asia  0.295* 0.326* 
  (0.171) (0.170) 
   Turkey  -0.0811 -0.133 
  (0.146) (0.149) 




   Portugal  -0.453** -0.475** 
  (0.181) (0.185) 
   Spain/ Italy  -0.400 -0.395 
  (0.245) (0.244) 
   Other European Union countries  -0.548*** -0.569*** 
  (0.179) (0.180) 
   Other regions  0.0590 0.0467 
  (0.120) (0.119) 
Female  -0.0468 -0.0108 
  (0.0790) (0.0831) 
Muslim  0.254*** 0.231** 
  (0.0975) (0.0966) 
 
Socio-demographics at the time of outcome 
French citizenship 
   
-0.188** 
   (0.0822) 
Marital status   -0.265*** 
   (0.0766) 
French proficiency (ref: very good speaking, comprehen-
sion, reading and writing)  
   
   Not at all   -0.202 
   (0.593) 
   Other   0.0345 
   (0.107) 
   Very good comprehension and spoken   -0.225 
   (0.142) 
Years in France   -0.00713* 
   (0.00426) 
Highest level of education (ref: no degree)    
   Junior or vocational high school   -0.0152 
   (0.0921) 
   Vocational or Regular Baccalaureate    -0.0530 
   (0.138) 
   University   -0.109 
   (0.178) 
Current employment status (ref: working)    
   Student   -0.571 
   (0.453) 
   Unemployed   0.189** 
   (0.0892) 
   Not working   -0.248** 
   (0.118) 
   Other   0.0478 
   (0.189) 
Constant 7.961*** 7.056*** 7.723*** 
 (0.0745) (0.249) (0.318) 
    
Observations 3,689 3,689 3,689 
R-squared 0.017 0.066 0.081 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 






Table 5: Initial Legal Status on Reporting Good Health 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Legal status at entry (ref: family reunification)    
Asylum -0.0987 -0.421** -0.228 
 (0.160) (0.207) (0.227) 
Student 1.299*** -0.00311 0.0544 
 (0.192) (0.228) (0.240) 
Worker -0.140 -0.430** -0.172 
 (0.137) (0.170) (0.182) 
French spouse 0.422** 0.0589 -0.0239 
 (0.169) (0.175) (0.183) 
No permit 0.261* -0.119 0.0628 
 (0.145) (0.160) (0.170) 
 
Immigrant selectivity 
   
Previous migration experience  -0.112 -0.0968 
  (0.143) (0.153) 
Visited France before migration  0.555*** 0.482*** 
  (0.142) (0.147) 
Type of work in CoA (ref: salaried work)    
   Never worked  0.155 0.206 
  (0.127) (0.134) 
   Worked unskilled or unpaid  0.0793 0.127 
  (0.151) (0.162) 
Highest education level in CoA (ref: higher education)    
   Primary school or less  -1.435*** -0.278 
  (0.182) (0.296) 
   Lower-secondary  -0.867*** -0.140 
  (0.173) (0.281) 
   Higher-secondary  -0.642*** -0.283 
  (0.158) (0.243) 
Married before migration  -0.171 -0.194 
  (0.117) (0.124) 
French proficiency on arrival    
    Not at all  -0.171 0.0836 
  (0.180) (0.238) 
    Other  0.0965 0.238 
   (0.144) (0.195) 
    Very good comprehension and spoken  -0.626 -0.385 
  (0.480) (0.496) 
Age at arrival  -0.0171* -0.0545*** 
  (0.00878) (0.00965) 
Employment contract before arrival  -0.211 0.0202 
  (0.177) (0.199) 
Temporary housing  -0.0927 -0.0819 
  (0.138) (0.147) 
Region of origin (ref: North Africa)    
   Sub-Saharan Africa   0.278 -0.0919 
  (0.177) (0.196) 
   Southeast Asia  -0.313 -0.187 
  (0.273) (0.301) 
   Turkey  0.337* 0.0635 
  (0.195) (0.212) 
   Portugal  -0.324 -0.427 




  (0.236) (0.270) 
   Spain/ Italy  -0.101 0.342 
  (0.327) (0.367) 
   Other European Union countries  0.654** 0.537* 
  (0.263) (0.276) 
   Other regions  0.319 0.136 
  (0.198) (0.223) 
Female  -0.534*** -0.562*** 
  (0.109) (0.121) 
Muslim  -0.0766 -0.211 
  (0.158) (0.172) 
 
Socio-demographics at the time of outcome 
   
French citizenship   -0.0302 
   (0.120) 
Marital status   0.0407 
   (0.138) 
French proficiency (ref: very good speaking, comprehen-
sion, reading and writing)  
   
   Not at all   1.114 
   (0.738) 
   Other   -0.406** 
   (0.171) 
   Very good comprehension and spoken   -0.579*** 
   (0.202) 
Years in France   -0.0617*** 
   (0.00644) 
Highest level of education (ref: no degree)    
   Junior or vocational high school   -0.105 
   (0.136) 
   Vocational or Regular Baccalaureate    0.474** 
   (0.210) 
   University   0.517* 
   (0.286) 
Current employment status (ref: working)    
   Student   -0.160 
   (0.544) 
   Unemployed   -0.678*** 
   (0.145) 
   Not working   -0.218 
   (0.159) 
   Other   -2.691*** 
   (0.327) 
Constant 0.967*** 2.666*** 4.449*** 
 (0.0989) (0.355) (0.507) 
    
Observations 3,689 3,689 3,689 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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